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Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL ON Economic Activity held its eighty-second con-
ference in Washington, D.C., on September 7 and 8, 2006. This issue of
the Brookings Papers includes the papers and discussions presented at the
conference. All three papers in this issue explore various aspects of the 
Chinese economy, which has grown rapidly in recent decades to become
one of the world’s largest. The first paper analyzes recent productivity
growth in China and the prospects for China’s economic catch-up with the
international productivity frontier. The second paper estimates current rates
of return on investment in China to gauge whether the country’s high
investment rate is sustainable. The third paper examines the state of China’s
banks and assesses the prospects for successful banking reform.
DURING THE PAST QUARTER century of market-based reform, China’s eco-
nomic performance has been extraordinary. In 1978, at the outset of reform,
China was the world’s tenth-largest economy, with a GDP less than 6 per-
cent that of the United States. By 2005, after two decades of growth aver-
aging about 9 percent a year, it had become the world’s fourth-largest
economy at current exchange rates, with a GDProughly one ﬁfth that of the
United States. If China’s growth advantage continues, in twenty-ﬁve years
China’s economy will rival the U.S. economy in absolute size, although it
will still have only a fraction of U.S. income per capita. In the ﬁrst article of
this volume, Gary Jefferson, Albert Hu, and Jian Su examine the rapid
productivity growth underlying this performance, both to understand its
sources and to inform judgments about its sustainability. They calculate
levels and growth rates of productivity by sector, industry, and region and
analyze rates of productivity convergence both within China and between
China and the advanced economies of the world. This analysis leads them
to discuss the institutional reforms they believe are needed to sustain
China’s rapid productivity growth in the future. 
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between a given industry in China and its counterpart on the international
frontier, understood as the corresponding industry in either the United
States or Japan, whichever has the higher productivity. The analysis utilizes
a data set compiled by China’s National Bureau of Statistics containing
annual observations on more than 20,000 large and medium-size enterprises
(the LME data set) over 1995 to 2004. Although this data set allows direct
industry-by-industry comparisons both across regions in China and between
China and the frontier, it has the disadvantage of excluding smaller enter-
prises, which probably leads it to overstate Chinese productivity and may bias
estimates of convergence if the importance of small ﬁrms changes over time. 
The authors first calculate labor productivity for twenty-seven manufac-
turing industries in each of China’s four regions: coastal, northeastern, cen-
tral, and western. As expected, productivity is found to have increased
sharply relative to the frontier between 1995 and 2002, the latest year for
which comparable frontier data are available, but it remains well below
frontier productivity except in a few coastal industries. In China’s leading
coastal region, labor productivity for these manufacturing enterprises rose
from only one ninth of frontier productivity in 1995 to one quarter in 2002.
In 1995 productivity in the coastal region was roughly twice that in the
northeastern region and more than three times that in the central and west-
ern regions. By 2002 the northeast’s productivity gap with the coast had
actually increased slightly, but the gaps between the coast and the other two
regions had narrowed considerably. 
Large productivity differences also exist between Chinese industry and
the other sectors of the economy. To examine these differences and how
they have changed over time, the authors turn to data disaggregated by
province from China’s national accounts. They compare output per worker
in industry (manufacturing, mining, and construction) with that in agricul-
ture (including forestry and ﬁshing) for the whole country over 1980–2005,
and with that in both agriculture and services, disaggregated by region, over
1995–2004. When official employment figures are used to measure labor
inputs, agricultural productivity was one sixth of industrial productivity in
1980; it then gained ground to roughly a quarter of industrial productivity
by 1990, but it has lost ground relative to industry since then. In 2005 out-
put per worker in agriculture was less than a seventh that in industry.
Regional data that include the services sector are available for 1995–2004.
They show that the coast has a substantial productivity advantage over the
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in services is much higher than that in agriculture both across regions and
over time, and by 2004 services were more than twice as productive as agri-
culture in every region. Some analysts are concerned that the ofﬁcial data
understate employment in industry and overstate it in agriculture. The
authors adjust the data to allow for these concerns, but this adjustment
results in changes over time that are qualitatively similar to those from the
ofﬁcial data. 
Turning to industrial productivity as measured in the national accounts,
the authors report noticeable differences from their ﬁndings using the LME
data set for manufacturing. The national accounts data show some conver-
gence of the central and western regions with the coast from 1995 to 2004,
although it is somewhat less dramatic than the convergence for manufac-
turing in the LME data. They also show very rapid productivity gains in the
northeast, which fully converges to the coast by 2004. The authors suggest
that the differences in results between these two sources in part reﬂect the
exclusion of enterprises in mining, petroleum, and electric power genera-
tion from the subset of LME data used in table 2, as well as the absence of
small firms, whose importance in the aggregate data may have changed
over time. 
Differences in the level and growth of labor productivity could arise
from differences in levels and changes in a variety of factors, including cap-
ital intensity, technology, and industrial composition. Analysis of differ-
ences in labor, capital, and total factor productivity (TFP) could provide
some clues as to the relative importance of these factors. Capital deepening
by itself would be expected to raise labor productivity but reduce cap-
ital productivity, leaving TFP unchanged, whereas adoption of more-
advanced technology would be expected to increase both. The LME data
set provides a rich base for estimating regional and industry differences in
these three different productivity measures. The authors run separate
regressions of the logs of each productivity measure on regional and indus-
try dummies for 1995 and 2004. Because individual enterprises are the
units of observation in these regressions, the resulting averages are not
comparable with the averages from either the national accounts data or the
aggregated LME data for manufacturing. 
The authors ﬁnd that coastal enterprises, after adjusting for industry mix
effects, enjoyed higher labor productivity than enterprises in other regions
in 1995, but their advantage had been substantially reduced by 2004. The
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ductivity. And after allowing for apparently signiﬁcant changes in industry
mix, there is essentially no change in these relative productivities by 2004.
TFP is effectively an average of the logarithms of labor and capital pro-
ductivities, but given the greater weight on labor and the more dramatic dif-
ferences in labor productivity across regions and time, it behaves
qualitatively like a dampened version of labor productivity. The conver-
gence of labor productivity across regions, combined with relatively little
convergence of capital productivity after controlling for industry, suggests
that improvement in the allocation of labor, and capital deepening, rather
than adoption of new technology, which would beneﬁt both labor and cap-
ital productivity, played the major role in achieving the gains in industrial
productivity during the period. 
Differences in factor productivities, whether among ﬁrms or across sec-
tors, presumably provide incentives for the reallocation of those factors 
and for the adoption of more-productive technology. How does the growth
of labor productivity over a given period, for a given industry and region,
depend on the initial gap between that industry-region’s productivity 
and the international frontier? The authors address this question by regress-
ing the growth in industry-region productivity on the gap between initial
industry-region productivity and productivity in the corresponding fron-
tier industry (both the logarithm of the gap and its square). As an additional
explanatory variable, they include the growth in frontier industry produc-
tivity, to allow for the possibility that more-rapid frontier growth creates
either less or more favorable opportunities for Chinese firms. They also
allow the response of the productivity gaps to depend on the individual
region. The regressions are estimated for the period 1995–2002. The size of
the initial gap is found to have a substantial and highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant effect on productivity growth. For example, under the authors’pre-
ferred specification, for a ratio of frontier productivity to Chinese
productivity of 10 (which is smaller than that for many coastal industries
in 1995), the predicted annual rate of growth in productivity is 11 percent,
implying a rapid reduction of such gaps even with substantial growth in
frontier productivity. The predicted growth for a comparable gap in the
other regions is about 3 percentage points lower. The authors suggest that
this disparity may reflect the concentration of foreign direct investment 
and research and development (R&D) spending in the coastal region, 
along with better institutional arrangements and more abundant human
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national technology.
All of the authors’specifications yield results that indicate, either by a
significant positive coefficient on the squared gap or by a negative inter-
cept, that a larger gap has a disproportionate effect on growth rates. Inter-
estingly, industries with higher rates of growth in frontier productivity
appear to have lower rates of productivity growth in China, other things
equal. The authors suggest several possible explanations. It may simply
reflect China’s comparative advantage. Or incentives for investment in
capital or technology in China may be greatest in industries where produc-
tivity growth in advanced countries is low, such as textiles, apparel, and
footwear. Or rapid productivity growth in advanced economies may dis-
courage Chinese ﬁrms from attempting to compete by modernizing. 
The authors turn to a more explicit analysis of the importance of labor
reallocation and capital accumulation to economic growth, looking for
evidence of improvement in the efﬁciency with which these factors of pro-
duction are allocated across sectors and within industry. The largest sectoral
differences in labor productivity are between agriculture and industry. The
authors use a simple two-sector model to show how, given this gap, real-
location of labor would be expected to raise the rate of growth of output,
assuming that productivity within a sector is not significantly affected by
the reallocation. The two crucial parameters are the difference in produc-
tivity levels between the two sectors and the fraction of labor in agriculture.
Moving a unit of labor from agriculture to industry simply increases total
output by the difference in sectoral productivities, but the effect on the rates
of output and productivity growth depends not only on the rate of reallo-
cation, but also on the relative size of the two sectors, with growth rates
diminishing as the relative size of the industrial sector increases. The effect
of moving labor from agriculture to industry is commonly cited. But the
authors note that much of China’s industrial sector is also quite back-
ward. If 80 percent of employment is in agriculture and such backward
industries, a 1 percent migration per year to industries with 2.5 times their
average productivity would add nearly 1 percentage point to the GDP
growth rate. If instead only half of employment is in the low-productivity
sectors, the same reallocation would generate additional growth of less
than 0.5 percentage point. 
The LME data set provides an opportunity to examine the extent to
which labor and capital have been reallocated from less to more produc-
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two ways. First, for those “survivor” enterprises that are present in the sam-
ple through the whole data period, they examine how the growth in labor
and capital, as well as growth in output and productivity, depends on the
productivity of those factors at the beginning of the period. Second, they
compare the productivity of enterprises that enter or exit the data set over
the period with that of the survivors. Equations for each variable are sep-
arately estimated for survivors for the two periods 1995–2000 and
2000–04. Labor growth is speciﬁed to depend on initial labor productivity,
capital growth on initial capital productivity, and growth in value added and
in TFP on initial TFP. The effects of initial productivity on growth rates
are allowed to vary by region. In both periods initial productivity has sig-
nificant and substantial effects on growth of both labor and capital. For
example, doubling the initial marginal productivity of labor adds about
10 percentage points to the annual rate of growth of labor in the central
region in 2000–04. 
The equations for value added and TFPboth show that higher initial TFP
results in slower output growth. It is not surprising that firms with higher
initial TFP would have slower subsequent growth in TFP than firms that
have more opportunity for catch-up. However, given the estimated respon-
siveness of labor and capital growth to their initial productivities, it is
somewhat puzzling that ﬁrms with higher TFP have slower growth of out-
put. Recognizing that high initial TFP need not mean high levels of both
labor and capital productivity may resolve the puzzle. It may be that ﬁrms
with relatively high initial labor productivity have relatively low initial cap-
ital productivity, or vice versa. Hence high initial TFP may not imply suf-
ficiently high rates of growth of the combined factor inputs to offset the
effects on output growth of the slower growth in TFP itself. 
Given the wide dispersion of labor and capital productivity among Chi-
nese enterprises, and given the changes set in motion by reform, very high
rates of exit and entry of ﬁrms might be expected. In the LME sample, with
an annual population of 22,000 to 27,000 ﬁrms, nearly 146,000 ﬁrms either
entered or exited in the period 1996–2004. For each of three subperiods,
1996–98, 1999–2001, and 2002–04, the authors compare the productivity
of entering ﬁrms in the year they enter and the productivity of exiting ﬁrms
in the year they exit with the productivity of survivor firms. During
1996–98 the labor productivity of exiting ﬁrms was 35 percent lower, and
that of entering firms 36 percent higher, than that of the survivors. In
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41 percent. In 2002–04 the labor productivity of exiting firms was 
47 percent lower that that of survivors, but entrants were marginally less
productive than survivors. The differences in capital productivity between
exiting and survivor firms were modest in all periods. But the capital
productivity of entrants was 61 percent greater than that of survivors in
1996–98 and more than 150 percent greater in the two later periods. Since
these differences in productivity are large, as are the numbers of exiting and
entering ﬁrms, this process of birth and death of ﬁrms is clearly an impor-
tant source of China’s productivity growth. 
The authors conclude that reallocation of capital and labor to more-
productive sectors and firms and the diffusion of technology to relatively
backward firms have been important sources of China’s productivity
growth and the narrowing of productivity gaps across its sectors and
regions. However, they believe that the contribution of these mechanisms
to growth is likely to diminish over time. They argue that whether China
can continue to close the gap with the advanced economies depends
broadly on two factors. The ﬁrst, and in the authors’view critical, factor is
China’s ability to create new technology and to absorb new domestic or
imported technology. The second factor, which is important to the achieve-
ment of the first, is China’s ability to continue the institutional reforms
that have provided the incentives to develop and employ new technologies
and to accumulate capital and reallocate labor. The authors are optimistic
on both fronts. 
The authors review the varied mechanisms leading to technological
advance, providing an extensive discussion of China’s capacity for tech-
nological invention and innovation. Growth in R&D and patenting are two
important measures of a science and technology takeoff. The authors cite
earlier work showing a striking pattern in which R&D spending in devel-
oping countries typically accelerates once such spending reaches 1 per-
cent of GDP. They believe that China, where R&D spending rose to 
1.4 percent of GDP in 2005, is firmly embarked on its science and tech-
nology takeoff. If China follows the path of East Asia’s recently industri-
alized economies, the intensity of its R&D effort will approach that of the
major advanced economies sometime during the next decade. The authors
also report a surge in patenting in China since 1991, which they believe
reflects key changes in patent laws and increasing levels of foreign direct
investment, particularly along the coast. 
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tives and opportunities to develop and employ new technologies, accumu-
late capital, and reallocate labor will be essential to China’s future progress.
Their list of important reforms is long, including reforms affecting land
ownership and intellectual property, labor mobility, corporate ownership
and governance, regional integration, banking, antitrust, and social insur-
ance. They regard the clarification and reallocation of property rights,
including corporate governance reform, as key. Expanding on their find-
ing that the productivity of entering firms has greatly exceeded that of
exiting firms, they report that during 1996–2003 the majority of exiting
ﬁrms were state owned, followed by collectively owned and shareholding
companies. In 2001–03 fewer than 23 percent of new entrants were state
owned. Noting that entrants are far more likely to be private, sharehold-
ing, foreign, or overseas firms than their exiting counterparts (“overseas”
ﬁrms are those with investment from residents of Hong Kong, Taiwan, or
Macao), the authors reason that encouraging their entry and continuing
the restructuring of state and collectively owned enterprises will be crucial
to maintaining rapid productivity growth. 
How likely is China to implement the institutional reforms that will be
important to its future? The authors cite three reasons for optimism: the his-
torical commitment of the political leadership to the reform process; the
commitments, inherent in China’s membership in the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, and in its accession to the World Trade Orga-
nization and in particular its intellectual property rights agreement, that
frame China’s future legal and political choices; and the fast-emerging mid-
dle class and entrepreneurs (the latter now eligible to become Communist
Party members), who expect their political leaders to do what is necessary
to sustain economic growth. Even though China’s Communist Party retains
a monopoly over political power, it is now arguably a contestable monop-
oly, and the Party will therefore need to be responsive to demands for social
and political reform. The authors recognize that serious challenges to
China’s economic and political systems remain, but they believe that
China’s leadership will continue to advance institutional reforms that sup-
port the underlying sources of productivity growth. 
THE SUSTAINED AND RAPID economic growth that China has achieved since
the start of its economic reforms has been accompanied by a remarkable
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with fixed investment exceeding 40 percent of GDP. Many observers are
concerned that this high level of investment is unsustainable and that a
correction is likely over the next few years, precipitating a sharp slow-
down in China’s economic expansion if and when it occurs. In the second
article of this volume, Chong-En Bai, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Yingyi Qian
examine the merits of this argument by estimating the rate of return to
capital and comparing it with rates of return in China itself in earlier years
and in other developing and developed economies. 
For their estimates of returns to capital, the authors draw on the latest ofﬁ-
cial data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Their estimates
span the period from the late 1970s, when reforms began, through 2005,
for which some data are still preliminary. The authors calculate annual rates
of return from separate estimates of capital income and the capital stock.
They estimate average nominal gross rate of return to capital as the ratio of
the nominal return to capital to the current replacement cost of the capital
stock, including in the numerator the capital gains that firms receive on their
capital stock. This gross return can also be expressed as the ratio of capi-
tal’s share of output to the capital-output ratio measured at current prices
plus the capital gain per unit of capital. The net real rate of return is that ratio
minus the rate of depreciation and the rate of change in output prices. The
authors use various measures of the income share of capital to estimate real
rates of return for the aggregate economy and for various regions and sectors.
For their base case the authors calculate the rate of return using the non-
labor share of aggregate income as the share of capital and the value of the
aggregate stock of ﬁxed capital as the measure of capital. They obtain the
value of the capital stock by the perpetual inventory method, applied sepa-
rately to investment in structures and investment in equipment. In this
base case the annual rate of return to capital fluctuated around 25 percent
through the 1980s and early 1990s, declined from the mid-1990s to 2001,
and has rebounded to between 20 and 25 percent in the past several years.
The authors note that such rates of return are not low relative to rates com-
puted in the same way elsewhere in the world. 
The authors recognize that the capital income used in these calculations
includes returns to quite different types of capital and may not produce
accurate estimates of the rates of return relevant for business decisions, and
therefore for judgments about whether investment is unsustainably high.
They therefore estimate several alternative measures of capital income. 
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dential construction has grown very rapidly in China and is a major part of
the fixed capital stock. The returns on this residential capital may not be
comparable with the returns to business capital, and furthermore, the ﬂow
of services generated by housing may well be mismeasured in the national
accounts. Adjusting both the capital stock and the nonlabor share of income
to remove the effects of the housing stock from their estimates, the authors
ﬁnd that the return to the nonhousing ﬁxed capital stock is roughly 5 per-
centage points higher than their base case returns in recent years. In earlier
years the difference was even greater, although the rise in the rate of return
observed during the past several years is still present.
The other adjustment that makes a big difference is the inclusion of
inventories in the capital stock. Although decisions about investing in
inventories may not reﬂect the same calculations about proﬁtability as deci-
sions about fixed capital, in part because the former represent a much
shorter-lived commitment, they require a similar commitment of ﬁnancial
resources and should be reﬂected in calculations of rates of return for that
reason. When the stock of inventories is added to the ﬁxed capital stock, the
estimated rate of return to capital is reduced in recent years by about 
the same amount that removing the housing stock raised it. However, the
inventory adjustment in these years is much less than in earlier years, per-
haps reflecting improving inventory management as the economy mod-
ernized as well as economies of scale to holding inventories as output grew.
Combining the adjustments for residential housing and inventory hold-
ings removes virtually all the trend decline in the base case estimate of
the rate of return and raises the rate of return in the most recent years to
new highs. 
As a third alternative, the authors convert returns to an after-tax basis.
This reduces rates of return throughout the period by about 10 percentage
points but has no effect on the trend in returns over time. They also compare
their estimates based on the NBS national accounts data with estimates by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development using an
industrial ﬁrm data base provided by the NBS. The ﬁrm data roughly cor-
roborate the authors’estimates; they also support the finding that returns
have risen in recent years. 
The authors discuss a variety of other conceptual issues with their esti-
mates. The returns to nonlabor income include rents to agricultural land and
mineral resources, both of which should be excluded to obtain the returns
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such rents to be removed from the aggregate data, they estimate the return
to capital excluding ﬁrst the agriculture sector and then, separately, the min-
ing (and petroleum) sector, by subtracting output, capital income, and
reproducible capital stock for each sector from the aggregates. However,
they ﬁnd that the returns estimated after either of these adjustments make
little difference to the overall picture of returns. In the early years, returns
excluding the mining sector are noticeably higher than in the base case, and
so their exclusion produces an exaggerated downward trend relative to base
case returns. Excluding agriculture has a similar but much smaller effect. In
recent years neither adjustment makes a noticeable difference to the esti-
mated rate of return. 
The authors then turn from their aggregate estimates to examine the
heterogeneity of returns to capital in China. Disaggregating the data into
three sectors—primary (agriculture), secondary (construction, mining,
and manufacturing), and tertiary (services)—they find changing patterns
in the rate of return over time. Under their base case definitions and con-
cepts, returns in the secondary sector have been relatively high, ranging
between 27 and 33 percent, except for a period around 1990 when they
fell noticeably. Returns in the primary sector rose steadily until the mid-
1990s and have since declined to the mid-teens. Returns in the tertiary
sector rose steadily to over 25 percent in the early 1990s and then
declined steadily to around 10 percent in recent years. The authors sug-
gest that many investments in the tertiary sector, such as schools and
infrastructure, generate returns elsewhere than in the tertiary sector itself,
and that much of that investment may contribute to output with a sub-
stantial lag. 
Turning to the data by province, and again using base case definitions
and concepts, the authors find, not surprisingly, that returns to capital are
generally highest in the eastern, largely coastal region, followed by the cen-
tral region, and are lowest in the western region. They also ﬁnd that the dis-
persion of returns across provinces has diminished over time. These results
are consistent with those of Gary Jefferson and his coauthors elsewhere in
this issue. Breaking the data into six-year subperiods and assigning
provinces to quartiles based on rates of return, the authors calculate a tran-
sition matrix that shows the probability of a province moving from one
quartile to another between successive subperiods. There is little mobility
before about 1990, but thereafter mobility across the top three quartiles
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mobility at any time. 
The authors conclude with an optimistic assessment of China’s invest-
ment prospects. By most of their measures, including the conceptually most
relevant ones, rates of return have not fallen despite high rates of invest-
ment. Nor are the estimated returns low by international standards. The
authors offer two possible reasons for these persistently high returns. First,
output growth, driven by growth in the labor force and in total factor pro-
ductivity, has been rapid, so that the capital-output ratio cannot have risen
by much even with high investment rates. Second, the capital share of
aggregate income has increased steadily since 1998, the period when
investment has grown most rapidly. That growth in the capital share, in
turn, may reﬂect the gradual restructuring of China’s industrial sector and
its move to more capital-intensive industries requiring higher investment
rates. The authors regard their results bearing on the efficiency of invest-
ment allocation as less informative. However, their geographic and sectoral
disaggregations indicate continued misallocation of capital. And they note
that even their finding of a reduction in the dispersion of returns across
provinces may mask continued misallocation at the level of the ﬁrm. 
THE ECONOMIC REFORMS THAT began in the 1980s shifted more than 
20 percent of China’s labor force out of its backward agricultural sector.
In the last decade alone, over 42 million workers moved from state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) into market-driven private firms. This movement of
labor, together with strong productivity gains, has made China’s industrial
sector a formidable competitor in world markets for a wide and growing
range of manufactured goods. By comparison, reform of China’s banking
sector has been slow. In large part this reﬂects the desire of authorities at all
levels of government to make the transition to a market economy a grad-
ual one, to avoid massive labor force disruptions that might threaten eco-
nomic and social stability. China’s largest banks, all of which are state
owned, have been used to subsidize both the backward agricultural sector,
in order to slow the migration of underemployed rural workers to the cities,
and the many inefficient state-owned firms, to avoid the large-scale un-
employment that would be expected if these unprofitable firms were
allowed to fail. This use of the major banks, however, conflicts with the
goal of reforming the banking system toward one that maximizes profits
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Nicholas Lardy in the 1990s. In recent years the central government has
made such reform a priority, and many observers believe it is needed to
maintain the rapid development of China’s economy. In the third article of
this volume, Wendy Dobson and Anil Kashyap evaluate the prospects for
successful bank reform in China in light of the system’s conﬂicting goals,
assess the risks should reform prove slow in coming, and propose how to
reduce the conflict between developing a modern banking system and
allowing other government priorities to intrude on bank lending. 
Dobson and Kashyap ﬁrst review how China’s banking system reached
its present state. The system is dominated by four state-owned banks that
were created in the late 1970s and early 1980s: the Bank of China (BOC),
the Chinese Construction Bank (CCB), the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC), and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). Today
these Big Four banks account for 55 percent of bank assets and loans and
60 percent of bank deposits. (Aﬁfth bank, the Bank of Communications, or
BoCom, is growing rapidly and accounts for about 4 percent of assets and
deposits.) Dobson and Kashyap explain the unconventional role these
banks played in their initial years of existence and how that role led to the
reforms that started in 1995. All the Big Four except ABC developed close
ties with nonfinancial SOEs and became responsible for their financing.
Most of these SOEs were unproﬁtable and required government subsidies,
which by the mid-1980s were provided as a matter of government policy
through loans from the state-owned banks. This “policy lending” left the
banks with growing portfolios of nonperforming loans (NPLs), which
required government ﬁnancial support of the banks themselves and provided
little or no incentive for them to develop the risk assessment skills and lend-
ing criteria that would enable them to allocate capital efﬁciently. 
Economic reforms starting in 1995 have addressed both the problem of
unproﬁtable industrial SOEs and the problem of dysfunctional banks. The
strategy for bank reform began with shoring up the banks’balance sheets.
NPLs have been removed from the banks in several steps, at a cumulative
cost estimated by the authors at between $240 billion and $430 billion, or
between 10 and 19 percent of China’s 2005 GDP. These costs include the
transfer of NPLs to four newly created asset management companies
(AMCs) in exchange for government-guaranteed bonds, and the direct
injection of capital from the government into the banks. By the end of 2005,
in three of the Big Four banks (ABC being the exception), NPLs had fallen
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ratios had been restored to 8 percent. What is more, the burden of support-
ing SOEs has been greatly reduced, because many unproﬁtable SOEs have
been closed, restructured, or sold. By 2004 total employment of industrial
SOEs had dropped nearly by half, to 21 million. 
The other two features of China’s bank reform strategy aim at bringing
constructive foreign influences to bear. Thus the second feature has been
to attract strategic foreign investors to existing banks, to provide not 
only capital but also expertise in bank management and governance. In
2004–05 global financial firms invested a total of $13.3 billion in the
largest Chinese banks. Foreign ownership of domestic banks is limited,
however, to 20 percent of total equity, and this limit has been reached in
the fast-growing BoCom. The third feature of the strategy has been to get
banks listed on foreign stock exchanges, in order to impose market pres-
sures and subject the banks to international standards of reporting accu-
racy and transparency. The largest banks, including BoCom, have already
been, or will soon be, listed on the Hong Kong or the Shanghai exchange,
or both. 
Although the authors concede that much progress has been made toward
modernizing the banking system, they have reservations about whether that
progress is yet sufficient. Their doubts, and the evidence for them, are of
three sorts: ﬁrst, that pressure for directed lending continues; second, that
credit quality problems persist despite the declines in acknowledged NPLs;
and third, that banks still lack the risk management expertise needed to
guard against a sharp rise in losses. 
The authors find abundant evidence that pressure for policy lending
will continue. They report that the government’s share of bank ownership is
larger in China than in any other country, clearly indicating a determination
to maintain at least the option of controlling credit. They also note that
maintaining employment while modernizing the nonﬁnancial economy will
remain a policy priority for many years to come. For the past decade and
more, this has meant using policy lending to direct credit, both toward
investment to create jobs in growth areas, and to sustain employment in
unproﬁtable SOEs and in stagnant or declining sectors such as agriculture.
Moreover, regional and local governments in China enjoy considerable
independence from Beijing, and local bank branches have strong ties to
the local economy and its SOEs, so that policy lending to protect employ-
ment reﬂects local as well as national priorities. 
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directed credit will continue both for targeted growth and for protecting
employment in declining areas. Although the number of SOEs and the 
size of their payrolls have been sharply reduced, SOEs remain a huge pres-
ence in the Chinese economy. China’s 32,000 industrial SOEs account 
for roughly half of total industrial assets. The vast majority of China’s
120,000 SOEs in all sectors are small enterprises, although the ten largest
account for over half of total SOE revenue. Individual firm data on prof-
itability and lending are hard to come by. But the authors calculate that, in
the aggregate, losses as a share of SOE assets rose in 2005 and 2006 after
declining steadily for several years. They also report on work by David
Dollar and Shang-Jin Wei indicating that SOEs are more reliant than private
firms on bank finance, and that less profitable SOEs are more reliant on
bank finance than are the more profitable SOEs, which presumably rely
more on retained earnings. 
The authors argue that new national policy initiatives are likely to gen-
erate new pressures to direct bank credit to SOEs. The new Five Year Plan
aims to redress the rural-urban imbalance in incomes and public services
that has arisen from the concentrated growth of the past decade. The plan
calls for both improving rural public services and accelerating urbanization
by creating 45 million new urban jobs. From an analysis of past invest-
ment patterns, the authors infer that industrial SOEs will enjoy a large share
of any future investment boom that arises under the new plan. 
A key reason for modernizing the banking system is to allocate credit
more efficiently throughout the economy. The authors provide direct evi-
dence that lending by the state-owned banks is governed by factors other
than proﬁtability. They cite several studies showing that businesses owned
by Communist Party members have historically received preferential loan
treatment, and that the Big Four banks have had far lower proﬁts than oth-
ers after allowing for differences in costs and output mix. They also note
that, since lending interest rates were deregulated in October 2004, the
range of rates charged by the state-owned banks has remained about as
compressed as in the United States (even though credit risk in China is
much greater), and more compressed than among other financial institu-
tions in China—evidence that the state-owned banks continue to give inad-
equate attention to risk. 
The authors turn next to data at the level of individual banks, available
mainly for the largest state-owned banks only, to assess how well these
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Richard Podpiera that found that the proﬁtability of these banks’customers
had no effect on the growth of loans at these banks during 1997–2004, and
that they were losing market share to smaller banks in the provinces with
more proﬁtable corporate customers. Although this indicates that smaller,
more efﬁcient banks are already thriving in China, the large banks remain
such a dominant factor in overall lending that their performance is still
crucial to China’s overall ﬁnancial performance. 
The authors are concerned that the large banks are continuing to lend to
the same SOEs whose NPLs were written off in the earlier bank recapital-
izations. At BoCom, which provides information on its largest borrowers,
five of the ten largest are SOEs. The authors also report that the percent-
age of loans from large banks that are delinquent for over ninety days rose
between 2004 and 2005, despite booming economic growth. Loans to local
governments for infrastructure projects were of sufficient concern to the
central government that, in 2006, it invalidated local government guaran-
tees on such loans and called on the banks to cease granting them. 
The authors also provide anecdotal evidence on how existing bank prac-
tices and incentives impede progress toward bank reform. Bank boards
and upper management are still dominated by Party ofﬁcials and other gov-
ernment appointees who have their own agendas and incentives. A quota-
tion from a local branch manager illustrates the problem: “If I lend money
to a SOE and it defaults, I will not be blamed. But if I make a loan to a
privately-owned shoe factory and it defaults, I will be blamed.” 
From their analysis of recent bank lending, the authors conclude that
many of the loans granted since the 2004–05 capital injections are vul-
nerable to negative shocks. They discuss the likelihood of such shocks
arising from two sources: the entry of foreign banks, which will begin in
2007, and a sharp slowdown in economic growth. The authors suggest that
large multinational banks are entering China because they see customers
there being underserved and the potential to fill existing voids in high-
margin activities such as credit cards, mortgages, and investment prod-
ucts. The authors do not, however, expect the foreign entrants to compete
aggressively with the big Chinese banks for lending share or for deposit
accounts, which would require large branch networks. Thus they do not see
competition from foreign banks as a negative shock to China’s large banks. 
The authors are more concerned about the risks and effects of an eco-
nomic slowdown. They note that recent growth has been unbalanced,
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much of this investment has been undertaken by state-owned or state-
dominated companies, which lack the full discipline of proﬁt-maximizing
firms, they fear it has given rise to excess capacity that leaves the invest-
ment rate highly vulnerable to a slowdown in the economy. Although two
other papers in this volume are relatively sanguine about investment
prospects in China, Dobson and Kashyap cite reports by the Asian Devel-
opment Bank and the Bank for International Settlements in support of this
fear. They also question whether the Chinese authorities would respond
effectively if they perceived the need to head off an unsustainable invest-
ment boom. They note that the authorities are reluctant to raise interest rates
substantially, fearing it would trigger an inﬂow of funds from abroad, and
are wary of currency appreciation that would slow export growth, putting
further pressure on proﬁts. Furthermore, whereas in a market-based econ-
omy the risk of overinvestment would slow borrowing, and bank lending
terms would become more stringent to reﬂect any increasing risk of over-
investment, much lending and borrowing in China is largely divorced from
such market discipline. 
The authors thus see a substantial risk of an economic slowdown in the
next several years arising from an end to the investment boom. And they
provide two, admittedly very rough, estimates of how much damage a
slowdown of 5 percentage points in GDP growth would do to the balance
sheets of the state-owned banks. Using a calculation from Standard &
Poor’s that relates loan performance to macroeconomic variables, they
calculate that NPLs would rise by an amount roughly equivalent to the
NPLs that were moved out of banks in the 1999 bank bailout. Looking
directly at loan conditions at the largest banks, they arrive at an estimate
of similar magnitude by assuming that all loans currently in the “special
mention” category (which indicates loans at risk) are pushed into non-
performance by the slowdown. They note that a bailout of the size indicated
by these estimates would be substantial, amounting to about 7 percent 
of GDP. 
Although such a bailout would be large by any standard, the Chinese
government may regard it as an acceptable price to pay for continuing the
present policies that maintain economic stability. The authors, however,
argue that the stability objective could be met at much lower cost to bank
reform and economic performance by totally separating policy lending
from conventional lending. All policy lending, under such a scheme, would
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would be left to the Communist Party. Without proﬁts from other activities,
the policy banks would not be able to commingle good and bad lending
results, and the subsidies involved in their policy lending would be trans-
parent and accounted for. The present state-owned banks, freed of the con-
flicts inherent in their present dual mandate, would enjoy a greatly
improved chance of developing the lending expertise required by bank
reform and market competition. 
The authors offer a detailed discussion of two alternative plans for
achieving this separation of present bank functions. The ﬁrst would assign
them to separate banks within each existing state-owned bank, whereas
the second would transform the existing banks into “narrow banks” that
take deposits but do not lend, investing instead in a limited range of safe
assets. The authors favor the narrow bank option if the political and insti-
tutional hurdles to isolating policy lending within existing banks are
deemed too large to overcome.
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